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In Bread upon the Waters, Robert 
E. Jones makes a strong case for 
viewing the daily activities of large 
social groups in imperial Russia in 
the long eighteenth century from 
an economic perspective. The book 
explicates the dynamics of the Rus-
sian grain trade over the course of 
the eighteenth century while engag-
ing with major themes in Russian 
historiography: economic policy 
and commerce, estate management, 
and geographic determinism. Jones 
explores the implications of desig-
nating St. Petersburg, a strategically 
situated port, as the capital of an em-
pire by demonstrating how this move 
created and shaped a grain market 
that extended down into the Russian 
heartland. Bread upon the Waters 
lays out the entire supply chain, from 
the soil to the table, which formed in 
an effort to bring provisions to the 
capital, highlighting both the indi-
vidual entrepreneurship in transport-
ing the grain as well as government 
efforts to regulate the price of bread 
in the capital. Through this excursion 
Jones sets up his explanation for the 
sudden and nearly continuous rise in 
the price of cereals in the second half 
of the eighteenth century. 
Bread upon the Waters builds on 
some of Jones’s earlier work on the 
grain trade,1 and while the combined 
narrative falls outside of recent 
historiographical trends in imperial 
and cultural history, the book is very 
much aware of them. Jones sees this 
work as complementary to recent 
narratives of Russia’s expansion.2 
For him, the acquisition of new 
territories could be seen as part of 
Russia’s economic policy, driven by 
a need for seaports and fertile land 
for a growing population (P. 72).3 
421
Ab Imperio, 1/2014
difficulties of transporting grain to 
St. Petersburg. The cost of transpor-
tation made up at least half the price 
of a chetvert (about 5.6 bushels) of 
flour in the capital. He also draws on 
the debates in Russian government 
to show the logic of Russia’s policy. 
These are a particularly interesting 
reflection of Russians’ understand-
ing of political economy in the 
eighteenth century. Moreover, many 
government policies, particularly 
regulation, were based on stereo-
types about merchants, who were 
seen as duplicitous price-gougers, 
while policies to increase production 
of grain sought to return peasants to 
their “rightful” place in the fields. 
Neither the imperial government’s 
efforts to supply its subjects with 
affordable bread nor the debates 
over the role of exports in its politi-
cal economy were unique to impe-
rial Russia. Russia’s particularism 
emerges in the delicate balance the 
government sought to achieve in its 
grain policy in St. Petersburg.
In the opening chapter Jones 
introduces the structural and policy 
changes that made St. Petersburg 
Russia’s main port. St. Petersburg’s 
main river, the Neva, was connected 
to Russia’s interior riverine network 
through a series of canals. This 
water transportation system made 
the flow of goods and provisions to 
St. Petersburg possible, and poli-
Whereas recent scholarship has em-
phasized other lenses through which 
to view human activity, Jones’s nar-
rative emphasizes “need for money 
as a motivator for human behavior” 
(P. 5). In contrast to the spate of 
academic literature on the pecu-
liarities of imperial governance in 
particular regions, this book instead 
shows how a unified St. Petersburg 
grain market formed across several 
regions of the Russian Empire. The 
Russian Empire governed regions 
differently, emphasized diversity, 
and practiced tolerance, but in some 
ways it also integrated the space it 
controlled. Bread upon the Waters 
shows that territories capable of 
producing grain and delivering the 
surplus to the waterways along the 
St. Petersburg supply chain became 
integrated into that market, while 
other fertile regions did not.
The book casts a wide net across 
imperial Russia’s social and eco-
nomic relations, but it focuses 
mainly on two, somewhat contradic-
tory trends: the government’s efforts 
to enable merchants to conduct the 
business of bringing grain to St. Pe-
tersburg while keeping grain prices 
low for consumers. In his approach 
to this broad subject, Jones draws on 
a variety of sources. He introduces 
statistics to calculate the demand for 
cereals, and rye in particular, in St. 
Petersburg and to demonstrate the 
 Oxford, 2004; John P. LeDonne. The Russian Empire and the World, 1700−1917: The 
Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment. New York, 1997.
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cies regulating exports from other 
cities ensured that goods for export 
would be routed to St. Petersburg. 
In this respect, cereals were dif-
ferent: while various regulations, 
including a tax-in-kind, ensured 
that provisions that were staples of 
the Russian diet would get to St. 
Petersburg, export of grains from 
St. Petersburg was either banned 
outright, or conditioned on the price 
of grain in Moscow. As the restric-
tions on grain export demonstrate, 
the imperial government recognized 
that it would need to make a choice 
between using the cereals delivered 
to St. Petersburg to provision the city 
and letting merchants export them to 
the international markets. At first, the 
imperial government saw cereals as 
different from other commodities, 
and treated them as such. Jones’s 
point is that the supply route and 
policies that were established in the 
first quarter of the eighteenth century 
for St. Petersburg as a port shaped its 
grain market as well.
The relationship between the 
imperial government and the mer-
chants, whose operations from col-
lecting surplus grain in the provinces 
to selling flour in St. Petersburg 
were essential to the cereals trade, 
is one of the novel aspects of Bread 
upon the Waters. For merchants to 
guarantee delivery to St. Petersburg, 
they needed to clear a profit on the 
grain they bought and transported 
to St. Petersburg. As Jones shows 
in chapter 2, the city’s government 
worked hard at managing the bal-
ance between attracting cereals to 
St. Petersburg and keeping the prices 
low enough for consumers to be 
able to afford them. Suspicious of 
merchants, the government heavily 
regulated the city’s flour markets, 
down to the times when merchants 
were allowed to sell flour in bulk. 
This vigilance shows the city gov-
ernment’s dual role as both a regula-
tor and a consumer of grains, which 
it bought to supply troop regiments 
and stock the public granary. Still, 
by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, many of the restrictions on 
merchants were lifted. Catherine II’s 
attitude even in the final decades 
of the eighteenth century was 
to “trust the free markets but not 
the merchants, who will conspire 
against it” (P. 55). But participation 
in the cereals trade, unlike trade in 
other goods, was not restricted to 
the merchant estate. Peasants and 
noblemen were also essential pro-
viders of surplus grain, although it 
was merchants who bought up small 
amounts to achieve the sizable mass 
that would eventually set out for the 
capital. Anecdotal evidence shows 
that some enterprising peasants not 
only participated in the grain trade 
but also were able to change their 
legal status as a result of their newly 
acquired roles. As Jones shows, 
when it came to the grain trade, the 
social and legal categories of mer-
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chant, noble, and peasant appear to 
be rather fluid. 
Chapter 5 provides insight into 
merchant business practices more 
generally, including the financial 
and legal instruments available to 
them in pursuance of their trade. 
This is commendable because, as 
Jones points out, our ability to learn 
about the merchant estate is severely 
limited by a lack of sources from this 
social group (P. 124). We also know 
little of their business as most mer-
chants did not keep written records 
until compelled by the government 
in 1800, and many of the subjects 
in this chapter such as merchant 
courts and bankruptcy have not 
been explored in great depth by his-
torians. But Jones presents Russia’s 
commercial culture as being defined 
by the merchant estate itself. Even 
while the government redefined the 
merchants’ privileges and obliga-
tions vis-à-vis the state in an effort to 
encourage commerce, there was oth-
erwise little information exchange 
between the two. The government 
left the resolution of commercial 
disputes to merchant courts and over 
the course of the eighteenth cen-
tury empowered them with greater 
oversight and regulations to ensure 
fairer business practices. In contrast 
to Viktor Zakharov, who has argued 
that the imperial government failed 
to provide merchants with necessary 
tools such as education and access to 
credit to thrive commercially, Jones 
sees the imperial government as 
having enabled merchants through 
self-government. He cites examples 
of the merchants organizing their 
own schools – initiatives that proved 
unsuccessful due to lack of inter-
est, not lack of government support 
as Zakharov suggests.4 Moreover, 
Jones argues that the government 
was, in fact, responsive to merchant 
demands and took their interests 
into consideration when making 
policy (P. 144). The most prominent 
component of that relationship is 
the government-created instruments 
of exchange, without which much 
of the activity in the grain market 
would not be possible. As the econo-
my had become more monetized, the 
government endeavored to release 
silver rubles and copper coins into 
circulation to allow peasants and 
merchants to conduct their business 
with one another. By the end of the 
eighteenth century, silver and cop-
per coins, paper rubles (assignatsii), 
and veksels circulated in Russia. 
Throughout the book Jones actively 
challenges the assumptions that the 
imperial Russian government stifled 
commerce.
The liberalization of the econ-
omy is the second central theme in 
4 Viktor Zakharov. Russian Trade Policy in the 18th Century // Ferry de Gooey and 
Jan Willem Veluwenkamp (Eds.). Entrepreneurs and Institutions in Europe and Asia, 
1500−2000. Amsterdam, 2002. Pp. 55-70.
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the book. For most of the eighteenth 
century, Russia’s policymakers did 
not view cereals as they did other 
commodities, making every effort 
to keep rye affordable by regulating 
many aspects of its trade and, most 
significantly, its export. In this way 
the imperial government’s efforts 
to control grain prices opposed the 
broader shifts in thinking about 
freedom of commerce. Under Cath-
erine II, when Russian policy leaned 
toward free commerce through 
abolition of trade monopolies and 
promotion of free competition, 
cereals were nevertheless treated 
exceptionally because they were the 
basic foodstuffs of most Russians’ 
diets. Catherine’s Commission on 
Commerce, the Free Economic 
Society, and many members of the 
Senate pushed for a more liberal 
grain policy, but exports of cereals 
were the one factor that the imperial 
government felt it could best control. 
As Jones notes, “virtually all par-
ticipants [in the debates over prices] 
assumed that exports would increase 
demand and raise prices” (P. 190). 
Despite many arguments for broader 
exports of grain from Russia – laid 
out in chapter 7 – Catherine II was 
reluctant to export cereals unless 
there was a guarantee of abundance 
and affordability at home. When the 
government did not ban exports of 
rye from St. Petersburg outright, it 
pegged exports to the price of cereals 
in St. Petersburg. Incrementally the 
export policy on cereals was liberal-
ized: ports other than St. Petersburg 
were permitted to export a limited 
amount of rye; wheat, a less crucial 
component of the Russian diet, was 
cleared for export from all cities; 
and finally, all ports were permitted 
to export all cereals, including rye. 
After the grain crisis of 1786−1787, 
permission to export rye was re-
voked, and the export policy was 
inconsistent for the next thirty years.
Each of the chapters offers a 
peek into the socioeconomic world 
around each link on the supply chain: 
life on the estates, seasonal labor and 
wage work, the business practices of 
merchants. Peasants, noblemen, and 
merchants – all of whom were key 
participants at various stages in the 
grain trade – made decisions within 
the structural constraints of geogra-
phy and legislation that affected the 
grain trade. As Jones suggests, these 
were often economically rational 
choices such as the form in which to 
transport the cereals: as grain, flour, 
or alcohol, as well as which river 
route the grain ought to take (chap-
ter 6). Peasants decided in which 
wage-earning activity to engage in 
order to meet their obligations to 
the state, commune, or landlord. 
Unable to make a profit by growing 
surplus grain, many peasants in the 
northern provinces sought different 
forms of labor. Many entered the 
supply chain as transporters rather 
than producers of grain and at the 
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same time increased the demand 
for grain from surplus-producing 
black-earth provinces (chapter 3). 
Nobles managing their estates had 
incentives for higher earnings in 
grain production to meet their vari-
ous financial obligations (chapter 
4).5 Cumulatively, these decisions 
added up to the production of a sur-
plus of grain and the availability of 
additional labor necessary to deliver 
provisions to the capital.
Then there is the question of ris-
ing cereal prices in the second half of 
the eighteenth century, which have 
puzzled historians for centuries. For 
generations of Marxist historians, 
grain prices were a way to under-
stand the evolution of Russia’s mar-
ket and development of capitalism in 
imperial Russia; for us, rising grain 
prices provide an excellent prism 
through which to examine Russia’s 
views of its political economy. The 
rising prices were of vital interest 
to Catherine II, who established the 
Commission on Grain in 1786 to try 
to understand the economics of grain 
transport to the capital. Such ques-
tions were important to historians in 
the Soviet era, for example, Boris 
Mironov, who suggested that it was, 
in fact, Russia’s exports of cereals 
in the late eighteenth century that 
increased prices of grain and flour 
in Russia.6 Jones disputes Mironov’s 
assumptions that there was an all-
Russia grain market that would 
reflect the exports of grain from one 
port in grain prices in St. Petersburg. 
Instead, he points to the increase 
of the money supply in the late 
eighteenth century and shows that 
the rise in cereals prices coincided 
with a simultaneous price increase 
in other goods and commodities (P. 
133). While this explanation does 
not necessarily disprove whether 
the government’s concerns about 
exports of grain from St. Petersburg 
raising prices were valid, Jones does 
point us to a new direction that could 
be studied by historians interested 
in the economics of the Russian 
Empire: the culture around the use 
of money and increased use of paper 
rubles. 
But there are also limits to how 
far an economic analysis can take 
us, as the Russian Empire’s activities 
were often not economically ratio-
nal. Take Peter the Great’s decision 
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to make St. Petersburg the site of the 
empire’s capital. As Jones explains 
in the first chapter of the book, it was 
a strategic location for a port, but a 
poor choice for a capital. In fact, 
Bread upon the Waters provides a 
striking contrast between what Jones 
sees as the macro-level irrationality 
of government policy and the “mi-
croeconomic rationality” (P. 62) of 
individual actors, who react to that 
policy in efficient and economically 
viable ways. This places the book 
in company with other works that 
demonstrate that imperial Russia’s 
activity was not always driven by 
purely economic concerns, but 
rather motivated by other values.7 
With this lingering question of rising 
commodity prices resolved, we can 
move on to investigate what those 
other values are.
7 E. A. Pravilova. Finansy imperii: den’gi 
i vlast’ v politike Rossii na natsional’nykh 
okrainakh, 1801−1917. Moscow, 2006.
